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Abstract
The international legal order seen through third-world lenses is embedded with Europe’s colonial
past. It is also a regime that assimilates the non-European being, its relations, and knowledge.
Consequently, changing such a framework is almost impossible because it is constantly rejected
by hegemonic powers. The framework is opposed only by the few nations controlling the modern
world order. Therefore, this study aimed to verify the argument by some people that the United
Nations presented the international legal order by breaking with the imperial system due to
sovereign equality among its nations. The United Nations presupposes the maintenance of the
status quo between hegemonic and subaltern states to perform its activities. This is based on the
analysis of the South West Africa decision delivered in the 1960s by the International Court of
Justice, an organ of the U.N. The Court’s recent activities on the Chagos Archipelago Opinion of
2019 showed that it tried to break with such a past timidly by reaffirming self-determination and
the U.N. General Assembly’s relevance. However, this was not enough because the Organization
was still a locus of reproduction of imperialism in the international order.
Keywords: United Nations, Imperialism, Third World, South West Africa Case, Chagos
Archipelago Advisory Opinion.
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I. INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, IMPERIALISM, AND
THE ONGOING OCCULTATION OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH
International law could be read from a critical perspective, considering
it is imperial and created out of the colonial encounter.1 This is reasonable,
particularly in countries of the Global South.2 Due to colonialism and neocolonialism that affected power distribution between states and people through
rules and institutions proposed by imperial nations in the turn of modernity.3
Modernity, according to Dussel, is commonly prescribed as “an emancipation, a ‘way out’ of immaturity
by an effort of reason as a critical process, which provided humanity with a new human development. This
process took place in Europe, essentially in the 18th century”. Nevertheless, here, we understand it, just
as presented by Dussel, to have a second view/definition, which “consist[s] in defining as a fundamental
aspect of the modern world to be in the ‘center’ (in terms of States, armies, economy, philosophy, etc.) of
world history. That is, empirically there was never world history until 1492 (the date of the start of the
‘World-System’). Before that date, empires or cultural systems coexisted among each other. Only with
the Portuguese expansion of the 15th century, which reached the Far East in the 16th [century], and with
3
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The results were the many injustices still present in the people’s everyday
lives.4
Since the arrival of the European in the Americas in 1492,5 the rules and
institutions that regulated the relation among peoples were derived from the
encounter.6 The rules and institutions were also set to serve the interests of those
in the North7 or in the center of the world system.8 This happened even when
it meant assimilating the non-Europeans, their relations, and knowledge.9 The
Europeans’ will trumped the Amerindians’ due to their belief of superiority in
knowledge, experience, culture, and wealth accumulation, considered a global
model.10
Europeanization was imposed forcefully and was considered legitimate.11.
the ‘discovery’ of Hispanic America, the entire planet became the ‘place’ of ‘only one’ history [dominated
by Europeans]”. Enrique Dussel, “Europa, modernidade e Eurocentrismo [Europe, modernity and Eurocentrism],” in A colonialidade do saber: eurocentrismo e ciências sociais [The coloniality of knowledge:

Eurocentrism and social sciences], edited by Edgardo Lander (Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2005), 28.
4
Antony Anghie and Buphinder S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts,” Chinese Journal of International Law 2, no. 1, (2003): 78, doi:
10.1093/oxfordjournals.cjilaw.a000480.
5
Enrique Dussel, “Desde o ‘ego’ europeu: o encobrimento [From the European ‘ego’: or cover-up],” in
1492: O Encobrimento do Outro [The Cover-up of the Other], ed. Enrique Dussel (Petrópolis: Vozes,
1993): 18.
6
Anghie and Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law,” 84. Buphinder S. Chimni, “The
Past, Present, and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach. Melbourne Journal of
International Law 8, no. 2, (2007): 501.
7
Walter D. Mignolo, “Colonialidade: o lado mais escuro da modernidade [Coloniality: the darkest side
of modernity],” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 34, no. 94, (2017): 3, doi: 10.17666/329402/2017.
8
See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
9
Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference (New
York: Routledge, 2004) at 106. From this idea of assimilating others due to their supposed inferiority is that
Quijano parts to ponder over the idea of coloniality of power that ruled the international division of labor,
creating a workforce based on the “phenotypic differences between conquerors and conquered” (Aníbal
Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America”, Nepantla – views from South 1, no. 3
(2000): 534). This later was subdivided into the coloniality of knowledge, too, by Quijano, which pointed
to whose knowledge were to be considered useful or even who could produce it, and the coloniality of being
by Mignolo, which established who could bear rights in society. Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and modernity/ rationality”, Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3, (2007): 169.; Walter D. Mignolo, “Introduction: coloniality
of power and de-colonial thinking”, Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3, (2007):156-157.
10
Dussel, “Europa, modernidade e Eurocentrismo,” 29.
11
This relates to the Valladolid debate (1550-1551) between Bartolomé Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda who addressed the legality of the European conquest of the Americas, along with Francisco de Vitoria. Sepulveda, in particular, were of the view that, since Amerindians were barbarians, by rejecting the
empire’s faith – the Christianity preached by the European/civilized – it could be imposed on them through
war, being it legit under natural law in his interpretation, and thus binding the Amerindians to ius gentium. See Enrique Dussel, “Meditaciones anti-cartesianas: sobre el origen del anti-discurso filosófico de la
Modernidad [Anti-cartesian meditations: on the origin of the anti-philosophical discourse of Modernity],”
Tabula Rasa 9 (2008): 153-198; Ramon Blanco and Ana Carolina Teixeira Delgado, “Problematising the
Ultimate Other of Modernity: the Crystallisation of Coloniality in International Politics,” Contexto Internacional 41, no. 3, (2019): 599-619, doi 10.1590/S0102-8529.2019410300006, at 610-612. Concerning Vitoria, even though he considered Indians to possess reason, he thought they were barbarians, thus, being part
of an inferior category of beings (compared to slaves) capable of taking orders but not rationally governing
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It forced the peoples from the South to follow the European paradigms as
general practices, with limited protection from phenotypic differences,12
societal organization13 and rulemaking.14 This paints international law as an
instrument of dominating the marginalized and legitimizing the European
colonial expansion. Therefore, it implicated several exclusions visible in
current society, such as in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Anghie15 defined
international law as rules that determine the conduct of civilized states in their
interactions.
Orford16 stated that extreme uneven development, inequality, mass
movement of peoples, civil war, food insecurity, and poverty are not caused by
the inherent characteristics or failed leadership of post-colonial states. They are
the effects of a historically constructed global political and economic system.
These effects have not ended with the independence of many nations from
their European colonizers. They are still ongoing under coloniality, defined as
maintaining colonialism after the decolonization17, which sustains the imperial
current international law18. According to Ndlovu19such logic has prescriptive
and performative characteristics. Prescriptive logic relates to denying the
possibility of change desired by an anti-systemic agency. Performative logic
entails the susceptibility of coloniality’s power structure to transformation and
re-arrangement without destruction and collapse.
This implies the impossibility of fully rearranging the international order
by promoting people’s independence and self-determination by attributing
sovereignty to the formerly colonized states in the 19th and 20th centuries
themselves. Therefore, because Europeans – precisely the Spanish – had such capacity, they had the just
right to travel, trade, spread the Christian religion, and defending themselves from those who oppose to it
(as it, in fact, constituted an act of aggression). See José-Manuel Barreto, “Imperialism and Decolonization
as Scenarios of Human Rights History,” in Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law, edited by José-Manuel Barreto (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2013), 146-149; Antony Anghie, “Colonial Origins of International Law”, in Laws of the Postcolonial, Eve
Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick, eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999), 94-97.
12
Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality of power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” Nepantla 1, no. 3 (2000): 534.
13
Sandhya Pahuja, “The postcoloniality of international law,” Harvard International Law Journal 46, no.
2, (2005): 463.
14
Antony Anghie, “The evolution of international law: colonial and postcolonial realities,” Third World
Quarterly 27, no. 5, (2006): 741, doi: 10.1080/01436590600780011.
15
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 108.
16
Anne Orford, “The past as law or history? The relevance of imperialism for modern international law,”
IILJ Working Paper 2: History and Theory of International Law Series, (2002):1-17.
17
Luciane Ballestrin, “Modernidade/Colonialidade sem ‘Imperialidade’? O Elo Perdido do Giro Decolonial [Modernity/Coloniality without ‘Imperiality’? The Missing Link of the Decolonial Turn],” DADOS
- Revista de Ciências Sociais 60, no. 2, (2017): 507, doi 10.1590/001152582017127.
18
Antony Anghie, 2004, supra note 15, at 105.
19
Morgan Ndlovu, “Coloniality of Knowledge and the Challenge of Creating African Futures,” Ufahamu
40, no. 2, (2018): 96, doi: 10.5070/F7402040944.
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in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, respectively. The collapse of colonialism
was performative within a prescriptive continuous historical structure of
coloniality.20 Since the basis of the system is the same, the countries from the
Global North that controlled the world system are still there, though labeled
as developed states instead of colonizers.21
In the past, the dominated peoples of the South adopted the European
standards based on the fallacious promise that they could be civilized.22 Today,
they grasp the same idea, but on the promise of development. This is why the
sovereignty acquired by countries of the Global South in a paradigmatic move
represents more their alienation and subordination than their empowerment.23
Additionally, international law is not a different system from the previous
imperial model,24 a view that the United Nations could not even flip. Mutua25
stated that:
After World War II, many colonies overthrew the yoke of direct colonial
rule, but they quickly realized that political independence was largely illusory.
Although now formally free, Third World states were still politically, legally,
and economically bonded to the West. The United Nations, formed after World
War II by the dominant Western powers, aimed to create and maintain global
order through peace, security, and cooperation among states. […] Ostensibly,
the United Nations was the new order’s neutral, universal, and fair guardian.
European hegemony over global affairs was transferred to the United States,
Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China, which allotted themselves
permanent seats at the Security Council, the most powerful UN organ. The
primacy of the Security Council over the UN General Assembly, which Third
World states would dominate, mocked the sovereign equality among states.
Otto26 parted from the postcolonial and not the decolonial perspective
Ibid., 97.
Henrique W. Afonso, “A questão desenvolvimentista na segunda metade do século XX: um olhar desde as
TWAIL [The developmental issue in the second half of the 20th century: a look from the TWAIL],” Revista
Quaestio Iuris 12, no. 3, (2019): 108, doi: 10.12957/rqi.2019.38776.
22
Anghie and Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law,” 501.
23
Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of International Law, 105.
24
When we affirm it is not different, we do not contend that no one questioned it. On the contrary, some realized that the existing structure would not be sufficient or even adequate to regulate international relations
that were now composed of more than European nations and unequal levels of development. Maurice Flory,
“Adapting international law to the development of the Third World”, Journal of African Law 26, (1982):
13 (“The developing countries look towards an adapted international law as being the formulation of an
agreed objective”); Arghyrios A. Fatouros, “International Law and the Third World”, Virgina Law Review
50, no. 5 (1964): 783 (“Western nations should undertake a change in approach and a reassessment of the
objectives of international law since the present situation of international society is so dissimilar to that in
which the law evolved”).
25
Makau W. Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” American Society of International Law Proceedings Washington
94, (2000): 34, doi 10.1017/S0272503700054896, at 34.
26
Diane Otto, “Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incommen20
21
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while examining the foundations of the new international global order
inaugurated by the United Nations. The study found that its European history
and commitment to an imperialist-designed state-based conception of the
international community presupposed maintaining the status quo between
central and marginalized or subalterns nations. It was orchestrated especially
through the law-making processes of the Organization that authorize and
perpetuate its Eurocentric foundation, frustrating the participation and limiting
the power of non-European states.27
This study hypothesized that the United Nations pursue the interests of
only a few central countries, particularly the Europeans and the United States,
since the turn of the 20th century.28 This is where Global South nations have
transferred part of their recently gained sovereignty in a frustrated attempt to
see an international law constituted between equals. However, the law remains
an instrument to pursue the interests of ancient colonial powers.29
This study aimed to test the hypothesis regarding the World Court being
required to debate the reminiscences of the colonial past. It used two cases of
the International Court of Justice: South West Africa of 1966 and the Chagos
Islands Advisory Opinion of 2019. The two cases were selected because they
discuss situations of decolonization and the Mandate or Trusteeship System.
This study aimed to contrast the findings of the Court in these two documents
separated by 53 years. It intended to verify the accuracy of the hypotheses,
especially considering the growing dissemination of international law critical
studies30 on an imperial past that aims at other futures.31
surability of Difference,” Social & Legal Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 338, doi:10.1177/096466399600500304.
27
Otto was just one example, along with Mutua. Ramina, too, criticizes the United Nations agenda, particularly its movement towards “the universalization of European principles and norms as the spread of human
rights which grow out of Western liberalism and jurisprudence”, asserting that “[t]he West was able to
impose its philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world because it dominated the United Nations at
its inception”. Nevertheless, considering her focus on the human rights agenda, we will not address it in the
main text. Larissa Ramina, “TWAIL - ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ and Human Rights:
Some Considerations,” Revista de Investigações Constitucionais 5, no. 1, (2018): 267.
28
Ramon Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Jose David Saldivar, Latino/as in the World-system:
Decolonization Struggles in the 21st Century U.S. Empire (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2017).
29
Ramina, TWAIL - ‘Third World Approaches to International Law’ and Human Rights,” 263.
30
Here we essentially highlight the Third World Approaches to International Law – TWAIL, which beyond
a unifying theory or an international law methodology, is a series of approaches aiming at, in a nutshell,
understanding the colonial legacy in the field of international law. See Galindo, 2016, supra note 2, at 75.
31
We use the term ‘futures’ in the plural form with the intention to eco the pluriverse theory that advances
the possibility of not excluding/erasing past legal elaborations, but to allow the creation of other alternatives, in the plural sense, which bases itself on the non-exclusion of other possibilities for the future taking
into consideration the differences among peoples. See Tatiana Squeff and Gabriel Damasceno, “Descolonizar o direito internacional em prol de múltiplas miradas: entre desmistificações e ressignificações [Decolonizing international law in favor of multiple perspectives: between demystifications and resignifications],”
in Direitos Humanos em Múltiplas Miradas [Human Rights on Multiple Edges], edited by Gabriel Mantelli
and Laura Mascaro (São Paulo: OAB/ESA, 2021), 277-278.
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This study found that the International Court of Justice reproduced
a colonial and imperial past. Although the Court discussed the right to selfdetermination in both cases, the sovereignty acquired by the new nations in
the South West Africa decision because of decolonization is insufficient for
their international involvement and development. In the Chagos Archipelago
Opinion, the Court incisively refuted having colonies in present-day society.
However, it did not act toward those pushing to maintain the status quo.

II. SOUTH
WEST
AFRICA
BEFORE
REMINISCENCES OF A COLONIAL PAST

THE

ICJ:

On 4 November 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia filed before the International
Court of Justice two applications regarding alleged violations by South Africa
mandated by South West Africa. Some submissions by the Applicants required
the Court to discuss sensitive issues, such as Apartheid and the principle of
self-determination.32 The two applications were united on a single proceeding
called the South West Africa case. In 1962, the Court issued rejected South
Africa’s preliminary objections,33 indicating that it would analyze the merits
of the dispute.34 Four years later, the Court decided the applicant states lacked
standing to discuss the case, not answering the issues raised by the parties.35
Before exploring the Court’s rationale and the 1966 decision per se,
it is important to review the background over which the decision was
issued. Higgins, decades later the president of the Court, stated that law
and politics were closely intertwined and that understanding the Judgment
requires comprehending the events leading to the litigation.36 Analyzing the
applicant states’ memorials shows that their claims were centered around
self-determination. To show that Apartheid violated international law, they
claimed South Africa violated South West Africa’s population’s right to selfSouth West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1966, 11-13.
Namely: (1) that the Mandate for South West Africa is a “treaty or convention in force” within the meaning of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court; (2) that despite the dissolution of the League, Ethiopia and Liberia had locus standi under Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Mandate, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court;
(3) that the dispute between the Applicants and the Respondent was a “dispute” as envisaged in Article 7,
paragraph 2, of the Mandate; and (4) that the prolonged exchanges of differing views in the General Assembly of the United Nations constituted a “negotiation” within the meaning of Article 7, paragraph 2, of
the Mandate and revealed (that the dispute could not be settled by negotiation within the meaning of that
same provision of the Mandate. (South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 1962).
34
Rosalyn Higgins, “The International Court of Justice and South West Africa: The implications of the
Judgment.” International Affairs 42, no. 4 (1996): 579, doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2610152.
35
Ibid., 577.
36
Ibid., 573
32
33
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determination.37
South West Africa was considered by the League of Nations Covenant a C
group mandate, defined by article 23 as follows:
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South
Paciﬁc Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, their small
size, their remoteness from the centers of civilization, their geographical
contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, could
be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of
its territory subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the
indigenous population.38
The topic of self-determination caused many heated debates in the United
Nations. Its consideration as a human right directly implicated those nations
not yet decolonized and their colonizers.39 The inclusion of self-determination
in the Charter was seen differently by States. Although some Northern
countries considered it a human right, they referred to self-determination as
a communist political doctrine.40 Consequently, the question of whether the
person to have the right to self-determination became a major political and
legal problem within the Organization.41
The Soviet view, inspired by Lenin’s interpretation of self-determination,
demanded an immediate end to European colonialism and made no distinction
between different Mandates or colonies.42 Since the deterioration of their
relationship with the central nations, the Soviets started closing their proximity
with Asian and African recently independent states, forming alliances in the
region. Due to the ongoing decolonization, the Asian and African States
increasingly became members of the United Nations during the 1950s and
1960s. Consequently, they kidnapped the topic of self-determination, and the
General Assembly became a space favorable for this agenda.43
In 1960, the General Assembly adopted the Decolonization Declaration,
Victor Kattan, “’There was An Elephant in the Court Room’: Reflections on the Role of Judge Sir Percy
Spender (1897-1985) in the South West Africa Cases (1960-1966) After Half a Century,” Leiden Journal of
International Law 31, no. 1 (2018): 148, doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156517000577.
38
League of Nations, The Covenant of the League of Nations, (28 April 1919), art. 22.
39
See, e.g., the following resolutions and their drafting process: United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on The right of peoples and nations to self-determination, A/RES/637(VII) (16 December 1952);
United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, A/RES/1514(XV) (14 December 1960).
40
See Victor Kattan, 2018, supra note 37.
41
James Mayall, “International Society, State Sovereignty, and National Self-Determination,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism, edited by John Breuilly. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 542.
42
Kattan, “Reflections on the Role of Judge Sir Percy Spender,” 151.
43
Ibid., 152.
37
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closer to the Soviet Union’s view of self-determination. According to the
declaration, it was for the people, not the administering power, to determine
when colonialism should end.44 The Court’s judges were aware of this
background that inevitably surrounded the South West Africa cases. Some were
even former delegates from their respective countries to the United Nations.45
This supports the analysis of the odd reasoning applied to the judgment from
1966, where the Court nullified the dispute’s merits.
In 1966, the Court affirmed that it needed to address a topic about the case
merits but with an antecedent character.46 This indicated that the applicant’s
standing in the proceedings could not be mistaken with appearing before the
Court and was not the object of the 1962 decision.47 The Court needed to
determine whether Liberia and Ethiopia had a legal interest or right regarding
the subject matter of the claims.48 To proceed to this analysis, it divided the
articles of the Mandate into two categories. The first category comprised
conduct provisions defining the mandatory state’s powers and obligations
towards the territory’s habitants, the League of Nations, and its organs. The
second category was special interests provisions conferring certain rights
regarding the mandated territory, directed at individual States members of the
League or its citizens.49
To the Court, the dispute between the parties related to the conduct
provisions. This denoted that the question would be whether the League
of Nations members, including Liberia and Ethiopia, had any legal interest
or right to question the mandatory State conduct regarding the provisions.
Another question was whether this function was reserved exclusively for the
League as an Organization. In the Court’s opinion, when the second option
was true, it would imply non-recognition of the applicants, a legal interest, or
right, culminating in their lack of standing.50
The Court contextualized the mandates’ creation, analyzed the League
of Nations’ role towards them, and understood, among other things, that
the League owned due to conduct of the mandates exclusively. Therefore,
members had no right to question the mandatory performance or ask the Court
to act on their behalf. This was because the affiliation to the League of Nations
United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, A/RES/1514(XV) (14 December 1960).
45
Kattan, “Reflections on the Role of Judge Sir Percy Spender,” 16.
46
ICJ South West Africa, para. 4.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid., para. 11.
50
Ibid., para. 15.
44
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did not confer such rights to its Member States.51
This curious legal malabarism52 applied by the Court was noticed because
the new majority of the Court’s bench in 1966 comprised the minority of
judges in 1962. Additionally, Judge Jessup53 affirmed in its extensive dissenting
opinion that the judgment was unfounded in law. The judgment was based on
the question of standing, a reason not even raised by the Respondent.54 Judge
Jessup meant that even when certain claims were to be discussed separately,
as the requests that South Africa had to abstain from certain attitudes on the
mandated territory, it was hard to deny the applicants a declaratory judgment:
I do not see how this clear picture could be clouded by describing the
claims as demands for the performance or enforcement of obligations owed by
the Respondent to the Applicants. The submissions may indeed involve that
element also, as would be noted. However, this element does not exclude the
concurrent requests for interpretation of the Mandate.55
Judge Jessup also described in its dissenting opinion two different forms
where the applicant states’ standing could have been established.56 Similarly,
Judge Higgins affirmed that the distinction made by the Court between
standing to appear before it and a standing relative to the case merits was
artificial and mistaken. This was because the two concepts must be similar
since the categories of states specified in the clause are presumably with a
legal interest in exercising the Mandate.57 Therefore, Judge Higgins agreed
that the Court needed to effectively reverse its 1962 decision, though not
explicitly acknowledging that in the judgment.58
Judge Higgins also stated that the choice to divide the mandate into the
conduct and special interests provisions was unpropounded in international
Ibid., para. 19-25
Here, we use the expression “legal malabarism” to define the rhetoric employed by the Court to reach
its final decision, which, at that time, was deprived of specific (legal) support, unusually formalist, and
contradictory.
53
South West Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jessup,
ICJ Reports 1966, 325.
54
Ibid., 336.
55
Ibid., 329.
56
He affirms that, first, a State would have a legal interest in receiving an authoritative pronouncement by
the Court regarding the practices in the mandated territory that would be disturbing the “good understanding between nations”, as the apartheid was, under article 7.2 jurisdictional clause, before taking the matter
to a diplomatic forum. Second, he also holds that the applicant’s standing could have been acknowledged
because of their general interests in the matter as members of the international community. South West
Africa (Ethiopia/Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jessup, ICJ Reports
1966. 373; 374; 424.
57
Rosalyn Higgins, “The International Court of Justice and South West Africa: The implications of the
Judgment.” International Affairs 42, no. 4 (1996): 580, doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2610152.
58
Ibid., 580-581.
51
52
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law and unsupported by Article 7 of the mandate.59 The acknowledgment that
Liberia and Ethiopia had standing could be based on conclusions drafted by
some judges on their opinions. According to Judge Higgins, such conclusions
were separate from the 1950 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of
South West Africa. The 1950 Advisory Opinion states that every State which
was a Member of the League at the time of its dissolution still had a legal
interest in the proper exercise of the Mandate.60
Tams61 considered the Court’s interpretation a restrictive approach to the
concept of standing, which was most consistent with a structural approach
to multilateral obligations. Nevertheless, it is odd how the Court applied a
restrictive approach to the 1966 judgment when it used an extensive approach
40 years before on the S.S. Wimbledon case to establish the applicant states’
standing. The dispute in the Wimbledon case concerned the legality of
Germany’s decision to refuse permission for the British steamship Wimbledon
to pass through the Kiel Canal. The allies claimed Article 380 of the Treaty of
Versailles was violated, while Germany argued that its refusal was in line with
its Neutrality Obligations.62
Japan and Italy had no interest in the dispute other than the general interest
of all State parties in the observance of the treaty regime. The Permanent
Court63 applied a flexible interpretation of the treaty’s jurisdictional clause,
which prescribed that any interested power could appeal to the jurisdiction.
The Court found that each of the four Applicant Powers was interested in
executing the Kiel Canal provisions. This was because they all possessed
fleets and merchant vessels flying their respective flags. Under this flexible
test applied by the Court, every seafaring State that was a party to the Treaty
of Versailles could enforce the rules in Article 380 against Germany in an
international forum.64
In the S.S. Wimbledon case, the Court adjudicated matters compatible
with European powers’ interests. This is different from the South West Africa
case, which concerned Apartheid and the self-determination principle. The
question is, why would the World Court issue a controversial decision,
effectively reversing its judgment from 1962 and countering its jurisprudence.
The role played by the President of the Court, Sir Percy Spender, may assist
Ibid., 583.
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair,
ICJ Reports 1950, 158.
61
Christian Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63-69.
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in answering this question.
Sir Percy was the Chairman of Australia’s Delegation to the UN General
Assembly from 1950 to 1957. He left the post only to become an International
Court of Justice judge in 1957. In 1964, Sir Percy became the President of
the Court between the two of South West Africa’s decisions. He believed that
self-determination was not a human right but a political doctrine aimed at
introducing a totalitarian government in South West Africa.65 As Australia’s
Chairman,66 Sir Percy delivered a speech at the United Nations General
Assembly’s third committee. The speech was a draft resolution that sought to
apply self-determination to non-self-governing territories and not just to trust
territories. He stated that:
I know the leaders of one great country, the Soviet Union, would welcome
the fragmentation of existing nations since it would facilitate their aggressive
designs. However, we should not allow the benign principle of selfdetermination to be used in the interests of world communism. To endeavor
to apply the principle of self-determination, which has nothing to do with
attaining self-government by territories, or to extend or alter these provisions,
would not serve the territories’ or the United Nations’ best interests.67
Kattan stated that Sir Percy was the driving force behind Australia’s
statements opposing self-determination and defending South Africa based on
the domestic jurisdiction provision in Article 2(7) of the Charter.68 Sir Percy
received support from South Africa’s Prime Minister, J.G. Strydom, during
his election to the Court in 1957. This happened even as South Africa was
boycotting the United Nations, assuming it would be unlikely to get a more
favorable judge than Sir Percy on legal issues affecting Article 2(7) and South
Africa.69
For the Court, analyzing the case merits would mean an analysis of the
Kattan, “Reflections on the Role of Judge Sir Percy Spender,” 149.
It is relevant to note other episodes during that time. In 1952, in a lecture he gave to the American Society
of International Law entitled ‘Law, Morality, and the Communist Challenge’, he explained that he did not
speak of Communism as a political philosophy but of the practice of ‘imperialistic Communism’ that was
‘challenging the free world’. Moreover, while he was Australia’s Chairman at the UN, an Australian delegate to the Political Committee delivered the following speech in defense of South Africa’s right to pass
racially discriminatory legislation: “With reference to the South African legislation, I would remark merely
that each country has its own political and moral philosophy, its own economic and social history and consequently its own laws and customs. It would be remarkable if we here were collectively or individually to
approve fully all the laws and customs of other countries. In fact, there may be cases where a number of us
disapprove quite strongly, but the merit or demerit of domestic laws is not the point at issue. The point is
whether they come within the competence of the United Nations Charter.” See Ibid., 145-146.
67
Ibid., 159.
68
It is important to highlight that Australia had a rule in Australian New Guinea similar to South Africa’s
rule in South West Africa. See Ibid.
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formation of customary international law regarding self-determination and
racial discrimination. Due to United Nations’ political orientation in the 1960s,
the inclusion of newly independent states would require considering those
States’ practices and opinio iuris.70 This was because most of those States had
aligned with the Soviet Union at the United Nations in opposing European
colonialism.71
The new white majority of 1966, as Venzke noted72 was composed of the
South African ad hoc judges from France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Greece,
and Poland and headed by the Court’s President, Sir Percy Spender. The
majority saw itself in a position where they would be willing to do much, even
to write a controversial decision that would destroy the Court’s reputation.73
Nevertheless, the Court retreated into an excessive formalism to defend the
interests of the Global North.74 The international community’s reaction to
this judgment reminded the Court that balancing the latter and the law and
safeguarding humanitarian considerations were its duties entrusted by the
international community.75
The two African applicant states, Liberia and Ethiopia, part of the Global
South, did not receive a response from the Court regarding their questions
on South Africa’s actions. However, in October 1966, the United Nations
General Assembly revoked South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa
and condemned its attitudes through Resolution no. 2145/1966, stating that:
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) [the Decolonization Declaration]
fully applies to the people of the Mandate territory of South West Africa.
Therefore, the people of South West Africa have the inalienable right to selfdetermination, freedom, and independence, according to the Charter of the
United Nations. Declaring that South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations
in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the
Ibid., 167.
Ibid.
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Ingo Venzke, “Public Interests in the International Court of Justice - A Comparison Between Nuclear Arms Race (2016) and South West Africa (1966),” AJIL Unbound 111 (2016): 72, doi: https://doi.
org/10.1017/aju.2017.23
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John R. Crook, “The International Court of Justice and Human Rights”, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2004): 6.
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conduct that a decision on the merits of the South West African Case would be highly embarrassing to them
politically. If men send up smoke-signals, they must not be surprised if they are read” Rosalyn Higgins,
“The International Court of Justice and South West Africa: The implications of the Judgment,” International Affairs 42, no. 4 (1996): 590, doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2610152.
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moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of
South West Africa have disavowed the Mandate.76
A few conclusions could be drawn from this case. First, the time frame of
its discussion before the Court highlights the difficulty of the debate regarding
the colonial past or legacy in the United Nations. This makes it a political
discourse in the West-versus-East contention, typical of the Cold War. It does
not reflect an attempt to review inequality between nations of the South beyond
recognizing their sovereignty or self-determination. Despite its affirmation in
the 1960s, this right does not represent the end of coloniality, making it more
discursive.
Second, the case shows the importance of oxygenating the World Court
benches. This was evident when Judge Spender indicated no convictions
independent of those of his State and member of the Global North. Consequently,
it was extremely difficult to advance in the debates put forward by Liberia and
Ethiopia. The debates involved the mandatory state’s responsibility for human
rights violations within a mandated territory. This recalls debates regarding the
responsibility to protect and how this is linked to an imperial past.77 However,
South Africa’s responsibilities were the ones being addressed. Although the
nation also suffered from colonization, it faced internal reminiscences of its
colonial past.
The United Nations was an instrument through its Court, promoting the
interests of countries in the center of the world system. Nevertheless, the
General Assembly should rethink the future of the Organization by proposing
a less imperialist debate. At the time of the case in question, the East-West
discussion was very much present.78 However, it is important to explore
whether these conclusions could be repeated or maintained. This necessitates
analyzing a more recent case, Chagos Islands Advisory Opinion.

III. THE CHAGOS ISLAND ADVISORY OPINION: HAS THE
COURT TAKEN A STEP TOWARDS BREAKING WITH AN
IMPERIAL PAST?
On 25 February 2019, the International Court of Justice delivered the
Advisory Opinion regarding the Legal Consequences of the Separation of
the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965.79 This advisory opinion was
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2145 (XXI), A/RES/2145(XXI) (27 October 1966).
See Ralph Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission
Never Went Away, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
78
Galindo, “A volta do terceiro mundo ao direito internacional,” 67.
79
Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, Advisory
Opinion of 25 February 2019.
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requested on 2 June 2017 by the United Nations General Assembly through
Resolution Number 71/292.80. Referring to Article 65 of the Court’s Statute.81
The Resolution asked the Court to address the legality of decolonizing
Mauritius during its independence in 1968, following the separation of the
Chagos Archipelago.82 The Assembly also requested the Court to indicate
consequences under international law that would arise from the continued
administration of the Chagos Archipelago by the United Kingdom. This
included Mauritius’s failure to resettle its nationals in the Archipelago,
particularly those of Chagossian origin.83
The case relates to the fact that the Republic of Mauritius, including
the Chagos Archipelago, comprised a colonial administrative unit of the
British Territory in the Indian Ocean. In 1965, three years before Mauritius’
independence, the United Kingdom detached the Chagos Archipelago area
from the colony of Mauritius. It systematically prevented the Chagossian
people from returning to the islands, including from Diego García, its largest
island, where the United States wanted to establish military defense facilities.84
In 1964, the talks between the United Kingdom and the United States
began over Diego Garcia. The United Kingdom was to resettle the population
living there and resolve the issues concerning the administration of Mauritius.
The United States would be responsible for the construction and maintenance
The questions presented to the Court were: “(a) Was the process of decolonization of Mauritius lawfully completed when Mauritius was granted independence in 1968, following the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius and having regard to international law, including obligations reflected in
General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2066 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2232
(XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2357 (XXII) of 19 December 1967?; and (b) What are the consequences
under international law, including obligations reflected in the above-mentioned resolutions, arising from
the continued administration by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the Chagos
Archipelago, including with respect to the inability of Mauritius to implement a program for the resettlement on the Chagos Archipelago of its nationals, in particular those of Chagossian origin?” (United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution Nº 71/292: Request for an advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965,
adopted on 22 June 2017, accessed on 05 February 2022, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/292).
81
Article 65: 1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever
body may be authorized by or following the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request. 2. Questions upon which the Court’s advisory opinion is asked shall be laid before the Court by means of a written
request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required and accompanied
by all documents likely to throw light upon the question. (Statute of the International Court of Justice,
(1945), accessed on 05 February 2022, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute).
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costs of any facility on the island.85 According to the United Kingdom, Diego
Garcia had to be detached from Mauritius before its independence and be
placed under its direct administration.86 It is thought to have the constitutional
power to take that action without Mauritius’ consent. This predicted possible
criticism in the United Nations, especially in light of Resolution 1514 (XV)
of 1960.87 The documents showed that the country decided to accept such
detachment before the Mauritian Ministers.88
It took over a year for the United Kingdom and Mauritius to agree
regarding Chagos Islands’ faith. Mauritius expressed concerns about possibly
creating a new colony during decolonization and establishing new military
bases when they should be getting out of old ones.89 However, they agreed on
various terms, including the payment of £3 million to Mauritius to cover direct
compensation to landowners and resettlement costs.90 A clause also stipulated
that any minerals or oil discovered in or near the Chagos Archipelago should
be reverted to the Mauritius Government.91 Another agreement was the
possible return of Chagos to Mauritius in the case the need for the facilities
on the islands disappeared.92 Therefore, on 05 November 1965, an agreement
called Lancaster House agreement on the detachment was confirmed.93
On 25 February 2019, the Court concluded that the decolonization of
Mauritius was not legally complete when independence was granted to
it. Similarly, it stressed that the United Kingdom was obligated to end its
administration of the Chagos Archipelago. The Court divided its analysis
into two main moments relating to the questions presented before it. First, the
Court turned to the nature, content, and scope of the right to self-determination
applicable to Mauritius’ decolonization process.
The Court emphasized that it was not resolving a territorial controversy
Ibid., para. 94.
Ibid., para. 95.
87
Ibid., para. 125. “On 14 December 1960, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1514 (XV) entitled
“Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (hereinafter “resolution
1514 (XV)”). On 27 November 1961, the General Assembly, by resolution 1654 (XVI), established the
United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (hereinafter the “Committee of Twenty-Four”) to
monitor the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV)” (Ibid, at para. 30). The Court also recognized this
Declaration to have a customary character.
88
Ibid., para. 95.
89
Ibid., para. 111.
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Mauritius and the United Kingdom (Ibid, para. 117), and again in another £4 million on an ex gratia basis
(Ibid., para. 119), which “was disbursed to 1,344 islanders between 1983 and 1984” (Ibid, para. 120). This
fact made a case brought before the European Court of Human Rights in 2012 by 1,786 Chagossians considered inadmissible (Ibid, para. 128).
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between the United Kingdom and Mauritius.94 Conversely, it was resolving a
controversy about decolonization and exercising the right of self-determination.
The two are cardinal issues in the work of the United Nations and the post1945 International Law Project.95 The Court noted that the decolonization
process accelerated in 1960, with 18 countries gaining independence,
including 17 in Africa. During the 1960s, the people of an additional 28
non-self-governing territories exercised their right to self-determination and
achieved independence.96
The Court also highlighted that the peoples of non-self-governing
territories are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination regarding
their territory. This integrity must be respected by the administering Power
unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the
territory concerned.97 The General Assembly’s Resolution no. 2232 (XXI) in
1996 established that partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of colonial Territories is illegal in light of Resolution no.
1514 (XV). However, the establishment of military bases and installations
in these Territories is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter.98
The Court held that the Chagos Archipelago was integral to that non-selfgoverning territory during its detachment from Mauritius in 1965. According
to the Court, Mauritius did not sign the 1965 Lancaster House agreement
while it was still a colony of the United Kingdom and under its authority.99 It
meant that this detachment was not based on the free and genuine expression
of the people’s will. This makes it impossible to consider Chagos legally
part of British Indian Ocean Territory since Mauritius must be completely
It shall be stressed that the United Kingdom and other participants of the proceedings before the Court
believed that it would be using its advisory procedure to resolve a contentious bilateral issue between the
United Kingdom and Mauritius. However, the Court’s jurisprudence reaffirms its position of privileging
the advisory function regardless of the possible impacts it may have on bilateral controversies, as stated in
the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, in which the Court highlighted the existence of different views between
states on legal issues has been present in virtually all advisory procedures. See Lucas C. Lima, “A Opinião
sobre o Arquipélago de Chagos: a jurisdição consultiva da Corte Internacional de Justiça e a noção de controvérsia”, Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFMG 75, (2019): 281-302, at 286; Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 274 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, 24.
95
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decolonized for that to happen.100
The United Kingdom disagreed with the Court, stating that Mauritius lacks
sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. This is because of the continuous
British sovereignty over Mauritius since 1814. Therefore, the United Kingdom
thought it could detach Chagos for its interests, which were those of the Global
North. Britain puts forward this argument to justify the occupation of part of
Mauritian territory by the United States military for nearly 40 years. It has
installed a base that has helped the United Kingdom, the United States, and
other allies combat some of the most challenging threats to international peace
and security, including terrorism, organized crime, and piracy. Moreover, the
facility remains ready for a rapid and impactful response to a humanitarian
crisis in the region because it is under the United Kingdom’s sovereignty and
the United States’s jurisdiction.101 The Opinion was silent on the future of the
United Stated base on Diego Garcia.102
After establishing that the decolonization process of Mauritius was not
legally completed, the Court examined the consequences under international
law arising from the United Kingdom’s continued administration of the Chagos
Archipelago. It held that the United Kingdom’s continued administration
constitutes an unlawful act entailing the international responsibility of that
State. Furthermore, the United Kingdom should end its administration of the
Chagos Archipelago. All Member States should cooperate with the United
Nations to complete the decolonization of Mauritius.103
The Court recalled that the right to self-determination is an erga omnes
obligation that all States have a legal interest in protecting. According to the
General Assembly’s prescription, all Member States must co-operate with
the United Nations to ensure the complete decolonization of Mauritius.104
Moreover, the Court stated that the resettlement in the Chagos Archipelago of
Mauritian citizens, including those of Chagossian origin, shall be addressed by
the General Assembly during the completion of Mauritius’ decolonization.105
Some remarks could be made based on this decision. First, the Court
stated that self-determination would not be considered a basic principle of
international law, with a normative character under customary international
Ibid., para. 172 and 174.
“Chagos: Londres rejette l’Advisory Opinion de la CIJ, Port-Louis “deeply disappointed”, LeMauricien,
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law with an erga omnes character. On the contrary, all States, including those
from the Global North, must follow such a prescription, which is a great
gain weakened by the right of self-determination. This provision does not
prevent its use from being incorrectly managed by other States to defend selfdetermination as an erga omnes rule or advance imperialist projects, such
as Portugal in the case of East Timor.106 Furthermore, its provision does not
address the rights of the peoples of the Fourth World. The peoples still have
their rights within the States violated107, as is the case in Brazil, regarding the
time frame of demarcating indigenous territories.108
The Court did not establish basic guidelines for respecting the right to
self-determination. It stated that this is a competence of the General Assembly,
raising the second point. The Court emphasizes the importance of the General
Assembly to debate the issue, recognizing this as the democratic space within
the Organization. This is detrimental to the Security Council, which is limited
regarding the participants and permanent members having the power to veto,
including the United Kingdom. Furthermore, there were no questions in
this regard, limiting the scope of the Opinion in establishing parameters for
action. The topic may take a long time to enter the agenda. This is due to the
political games permeating the Organization since its erection and the debates
surrounding it.
The arguments used by the Court in this decision are not necessarily
innovative. The factual context of the present case regarding decolonization
broadened the scope of action of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. It called
upon the international community to take positive steps to end colonization.
However, the question is whether this would break the imperial past of the
international order and its structural effects on international law. This is
impossible because it would require the Court’s ambition to build its legacy
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, ICJ Reports 1995, 102.
Hiroshi Fukurai, “Fourth World Approaches to International Law (FWAIL) and Asia’s Indigenous
Struggles and Quests for Recognition under International Law, Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1,
(2018): 225.
108
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Kaingang, and Guarini peoples, before the Supreme Court of Brazil. To judge the case, the justices instituted the “temporal landmark” thesis to define if the indigenous people would have the right to the lands
according to the time-lapse of acquisition and the promulgation of the Federal Constitution of 1988. While
for some justices, such as Edson Fachin, the constitutional protection of indigenous people is independent
of the time frame - because it is a human right; for other justices, the analysis of the time frame is indispensable – which makes the rights of indigenous people even more difficult and vulnerable. See Dailor Sartori
Junior, Pesamento descolonial e direitos indígenas: uma crítica à tese do ‘marco temporal da ocupação’
[Decolonial thinking and indigenous rights: a critique of the thesis of the ‘time frame of occupation’], (Rio
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regarding constructing other futures.109
A new composition of the Court that is more open and with judges from
the South110 could happen in the future. However, the compliance of central
countries would be impossible, even in the face of an eventual sentence or
opinion that promotes such a rupture in favor of those other futures. This is
due to the characteristics of the current international order, nevertheless, the
Chagos Opinion is a start.

IV. CONCLUSION
The international law in force in international relations is a European model.
It was universalized through European colonial expansion since the turn of
modernity. The construction of the law did not involve other people intended
as its object. Despite the end of colonialism, this imperial past remained,
making the marginalized people mere extras of the international order or even
its object. In this case, coloniality is a hallmark of contemporary society. It
relegates to the Global South nations the role of spectators in decision-making
on the international division of labor, the rights to be attributed to individuals,
or how knowledge is created or spread.
An example of this situation is the attempt to create an international
framework within the United Nations that cares about sovereign equality
between nations. It is a central feature lacking for the peoples of the South to
be accepted as central countries in the colonial logic. Therefore, the structuring
of rules such as self-determination seemed to be a fundamental requirement
and the need to assert sovereignty over natural resources. This was seen when
Mauritius demanded while negotiating its independence and the faith of
Chagos along with the British.
That would not be enough due to several reasons. First, structuring the
Trusteeship System at the United Nations, replacing the League of Nations
mandates, is a reproduction of the remaining international imperiality. It
was necessary to place a non-self-governing territory under the tutelage of
Antony Anghie; Martti Koskenniemi; Anne Orford, Imperialismo y derecho internacional: historia y legado [Imperialism and international law: history and legacy] (Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, 2016),
19.
110
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is aware of the imperiality that surrounds the international order (or even is a TWAILer), but at least coming from reality from the margins, it is believed that he/she is more aware of the existence of coloniality.
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another State to make it independent. The Northern countries transmitted this
recipe through the Organization to the countries they previously dominated.
Sometimes, even placing such nations in the hands of other countries controlled
by the North seemed to outwit the existence of coloniality. When this matter
was ripe for debating, such as the International Court of Justice in the South
West Africa case, it was silenced because the Global North aimed to maintain
the status quo.
Second, conferring independence and the long-awaited equality no longer
proved to be an aspect considered equal in the international order. In the mid20th Century, it was necessary to be a developed country, which became
far from being conquered by the Global South. The idea of the modern
international order is not to allow the center to be invaded from the margins.
The International Court of Justice confirmed that the United Nations
reproduces imperiality, despite having many tools capable of altering the future.
In the South West Africa decision, the Court noted that the politics behind the
Organization in the 1960s were aligned with the exchange of sovereignty for
development. It was a tool for maintaining power and status quo, as expressed
by the Third World Approaches to International Law doctrine.
In the Chagos Archipelago Opinion, the Court was timid, despite attempts
to open up the international order to the erection. This was seen in refuting
the existence of colonies today, arguments against self-determination, or
reaffirming the relevance of the General Assembly. This is much linked to
international politics because Diego Garcia’s future concerning the United
States military base was not debated. However, the Court probably did what it
could with the cards available on the table.
The international agenda of the second decade of the 21st century is
marked by the judicialization of international law. It is also characterized by
its common goal of realizing an international justice ideal.111 This implies
breaking with the existent and reminiscent imperialist order. Therefore, the
way forward may be to push the International Court of Justice to debate such
matters in Advisory Opinions. Bedi112 stated that this mechanism induces the
Court to the legal and mental process of providing a step forward in developing
the norms invoked in the case. The issuing of an Opinion may constitute an
evolution of the international norm because it declares the law itself. This
was stated by Judge Gros in the judgment of the Western Sahara case.113
Hans Wehberg, The Problem of an International Court of Justice, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1918) at 13.
Shiv R. S Bedi, The Development of Human Rights Law by the Judges of the International Court of
Justice, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, Studies in International Law, 2007), at 13.
113
Judge Gros stated that: “Je rappellerai seulement que la Cour, lorsqu’elle rend un avis consultatif sur
une question de droit, dit le droit. Je rappellerai seulement que la Cour, lorsqu’elle rend un avis consul111
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Consequently, the United Nations could break with imperialism from within,
which would be extremely positive. The critical international law approach
seeks not to change the past but to allow other futures.

tatif sur une question de droit, dit le droit. L’absence de force obligatoire ne transforme pas la démarche
judiciaire en consultation juridique qu’on utilise ou non à sa guise. L’avis consultatif détermine le droit
applicable à la question posée; il est possible que l’organe qui a demandé I’avis ne le suive pas dans son
action, mais cet organe sait qu’il ne pourrait adopter une position contraire au prononcé de la Cour avec
une efficacité quelconque sur le plan juridique” (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1975,
Separate Opinion by Judge Gros, ICJ Reports 1975, at 73).
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